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1 | INTRODUCTION
The subject of bank competition and risk has returned to the fore with the global financial crisis
(GFC) in 2008–2009, with a popular view being that competition between financial institutions
during the preceding boom was an important feature underlying the crisis (e.g., the majority view
of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011). This, in turn, would imply that the benefits of
banking competition for economic growth and efficiency need to be considered in the balance. On
the other hand, an extensive literature, generally estimated using pre-crisis data, finds diverse
results for the relationship between competition and risk. This follows, on the one hand, the so-
called franchise value or competition–fragility approach − that more competition reduces the value
of a banking licence and thus induces firms to take more risk − and, on the other hand, the
competition–stability view, that, with low levels of competition, banks may charge excessively
high rates of interest on loans and hence generate adverse selection and moral hazard on their loan
books. Both types of results have been found in the empirical literature. An emerging set of studies
also suggests that both high and low levels of competition may be adverse for risk, that is, there is a
U-shaped relationship, and that structural and regulatory features could affect country-level trade-
offs.
Further ambiguity was introduced by the common use of the concentration of a banking
system as a proxy for competition in earlier work in this area (e.g., Beck et al., 2006). However,
the theory of contestable markets suggests a concentrated system may be highly competitive if
there is sufficient potential competition from outside, as may be permitted by regulations
allowing new entry, as in the European Single Market. The empirical literature mostly covers
the period up to 2007, thus leaving open the interpretation of the post-crisis world, in which
there are a diminishing number of banks, extensive government intervention, and − many
would argue − less competition. The literature also suggests untested assumptions behind
proposals for enforced structural change in banking, such as the Vickers proposal in the United
Kingdom.
In this paper, we relate indices of banking market competition for the United Kingdom and
other European Union (EU) countries to banking risk. Our aim is to test for dynamic as well as
long-run links from competition to risk, before as well as after the GFC, thus highlighting
further nuances in the relation of competition to stability that have not been emphasized in the
literature to date. First, we use the Panzar–Rosse H-statistic to assess the changing nature of
competition in individual markets over time. Among earlier studies using this approach is an
analysis of the competition in the major Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) countries
compared to the United States just prior to the EMU (De Bandt and Davis, 2000). Second, we
investigate alternative approaches to measuring bank competition by using Iwata's Lerner index
(Bikker, 2004).
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we briefly examine the theoretical literature and
summarize recent empirical work on competition and risk in banking, highlighting the fact that the
datasets used largely cover the boom period or before, with relatively little work on the post-GFC
period. We note that empirical as well as theoretical work offers diverse findings and we probe the
reasons why. We question, for example, whether global datasets are fully informative for policy in
advanced countries. In section 3, we outline the data and methodology we use in the exercise, before
discussing our empirical results. We test the impact of each measure of competition on risk,
differentiating between static and dynamic aspects and between the results from the H-statistic and
Lerner index and showing several robustness checks, before considering reasons for differences.
The final section draws our conclusions.
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2 | LITERATURE SURVEY
As mentioned, there are two broad approaches to the relationship between banking competition and
risk. The theory of franchise value (Keeley, 1990), or competition–fragility, suggests that institutions
in an uncompetitive banking system have incentives to avoid risk, because a banking licence is
valuable in such a context, with restricted entry and probably large capital cushions (technically, the
franchise value is high due to monopoly rents). This typifies the highly regulated situation of banking
systems fromWorld War II to the late 20th century, when banks had a great deal of market power and
there was little financial instability. Then, when deregulation arises, the value of the licence declines as
excess returns are competed away by new entrants (from abroad as well, where permitted) and bymore
intense competition between existing players. This situation gives incentives to increase balance sheet
risk to recover the previous level of profitability, since banks effectively shift risks to depositors (or
deposit insurers) and thus become more vulnerable to shocks. In a context of limited liability, there is
also asymmetric risk for owners andmanagers, which can increase the positive effect of competition on
risk. This effect could be intensified by an incentive to underinvest in screening and monitoring, since
information rents from lending relationships are less valuable, as customers can switch banks more
readily (Allen and Gale, 2000, 2004). Meanwhile, larger banks in a less competitive system may be
better able to diversify risks and are easier to supervise (Allen and Gale, 2000; World Bank, 2013).
The alternative approach, which is due to Boyd and De Nicolo (2005), is often called the
competition–stability approach. Whereas lower lending rates in competitive banking markets increase
borrower scope for repayment, higher lending rates in uncompetitive markets lead to adverse selection,
with only riskier borrowers seeking funds and moral hazard inducing borrowing firms to take greater
risks (e.g., Stiglitz andWeiss, 1981). With perfect correlation of loan defaults, this naturally affects the
entire portfolio. Large banks in uncompetitive markets can also be harder to supervise (Beck et al.,
2006) and are vulnerable both to contagion and to ‘too big to fail’ incentives for risk taking, which can
enhance the competition–stability effect (Mishkin, 1998).
An extension of Boyd and De Nicolo's (2005) approach allowing for imperfect correlation in loan
defaults can instead generate a U-shaped relationship between risk and competition (Martinez-Miera
and Repullo, 2010), since the initial benefit to lower probabilities of default from lower loan rates (risk-
shifting effect) begins to be offset by lower revenues (margin effect), leading to instability. Wagner
(2010) shows that, if banks can adjust their loan portfolios, the link from competition to risk taking
could be reversed, since, for example, when borrowers become safer, banks shift their portfolios to
higher-risk borrowers per se. There could be overcompensation due to loss of franchise value from
competition. Hakenes and Schnabel (2011) show that the effect of capital adequacy on risk taking
depends on whether the market is subject to competition–stability or competition–fragility, since
capital requirements reduce competition, raise interest rates, and can lead banks to choose more
correlated loan portfolios. Berger et al. (2009) argue that, even if loss of market power induces riskier
loan portfolios, charter values may not fall if banks protect themselves with higher equity, lower risk
securities, or the use of credit derivatives. This argument could help reconcile the two hypotheses.
The empirical literature is summarized in Table 1. For a more detailed discussion, see Davis and
Karim (2013). Note at this point that the outstanding result from existing work is there are differing
outcomes in terms of the competition–fragility and competition–stability paradigms. Some papers
consistently favour the former, others the latter, while still others suggest that the outcome may differ
between countries with structural and regulatory factors or even with the level of competition itself.
Unlike the studies cited above, we are able to cover comparable periods before and after the GFC,
using Bankscope data up to 2012 and the 2011 wave of the World Bank Regulation and Supervision
Database (Barth et al., 2012; Čihák et al., 2012b).
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Beck et al. (2010) note that many results in the literature could be driven by the trend to consolidate
during the Great Moderation of the early 2000s and/or may not hold in times of systemic global
distress. Competitive systems might foster stability in normal times, for example, but contribute to
bubbles, herding behavior, and the use of untested innovations in booms and credit crunches in times of
recession or crisis. This implies a possible distinction between the long- and short-run relationships to
competition, as well as before and after the GFC, that we test in our work.
Furthermore, competition may not have been the key factor underlying risk taking during the Great
Moderation. It could have been the global liquidity glut and regulatory easing from Basel II (Barrell
and Davis, 2008), as well as disaster myopia (e.g., measured by the time since the last crisis, as shown
for East Asian banks by Craig et al., 2006) and risk-taking incentives on the part of the too big to fail.
This can be tested by the relationship of competition to risk in our regressions. Furthermore, the broad
issue of incentives has barely been applied in this field, although the work of Gropp et al. (2010) is an
exception.
In this context, it could be suggested that the competition–fragility approach is characteristic of
banking systems that have been recently deregulated, as in the case of the United States in the original
franchise value study by Keeley (1990), or that are subject to other forms of structural change.
However, as time passes, banks have become habituated to a deregulated system and the level of
competition has become synonymous with stability. This pattern is in line with the industrial approach
to financial instability proposed by Davis (1995, 1999), whereby a warning sign of financial instability
is a change in entry conditions for institutions to financial markets, generating a rapid increase in
competition after new entry. Mechanisms generating risk include the way new entrants to financial
marketsmay induce borrowers to switch away from established credit relationships or offer extra credit
to gain market share (by offering lower prices). Information-based linkages will thus be weakened and
existing information devalued and risk increases overall (see Appendix A for more details). This effect
will, however, be temporary and, in the long term, the market will settle down to a new level of
competition.
Whereas this argument is clearly not fully consistent with the 2000–07 boom, the underlying
relationship could be overlaid by these additional factors, which can be tested. Again, a corollary may
be that the established level of competition is consistent with stability but abrupt changes in
competition (e.g., after deregulation, as well as during periods of new entry, prolonged booms, or
financial innovation) could have a negative impact. That is, a static–dynamic distinction arises again
that has not been tested in the literature to date.
Furthermore, most studies are based on global samples. In Barrell et al. (2010) and Davis et al.
(2011), we question whether this is the best approach for detecting the competition–risk trade-off, since
the behavior of advanced countries (as in the EU) may differ from that of emerging market economies.
It is telling that one of themost recent studies shows that ‘an increase in competition is associatedwith a
larger rise in banks’ fragility in countries with stricter activity restrictions, lower systemic fragility,
better developed stock exchanges, more generous deposit insurance and more effective systems of
credit information sharing’ (Beck et al., 2013, p. 219), some of which are advanced country
characteristics. In addition, EU countries have a more homogeneous regulatory framework than a
global sample does, which helps eliminate one cause of variation in the competition–stability trade-
off.1
1In Figure 2 of Beck et al. (2013), all EU countries other than Latvia and Luxembourg have a positive trade-off between
competition (measured by the Lerner index) and risk (measured by the Z-score) and the positive effect is significant, except
for the Netherlands, Romania and Ireland (although the significant effects do vary from roughly 0.5 to 3.0).
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There has not been much discussion in the recent literature of how macroprudential policies,
such as loan-to-value limits, might relate to competition. The prevailing assumptions of
macroprudential policies are generally based on the competition–fragility link and do not take
into account variations in the trade-off shown in the literature survey. In addition, competition in
wholesale funding has not been examined in most studies, particularly its relation to risk (with the
exception of Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). Studies typically focus on the banking system in
a country (or country by country) per se. Intensive securities market competition and/or competition
from shadow banking may interact with bank risk taking and competition in countries with more
diverse financial systems. Hence, it is important to at least include indicators of securities market
activity as control variables.
3 | DATA
We use data from Bankscope for the EU countries, ensuring a degree of commonality in terms of the
regulatory framework. In particular, controls on entry should be low, helping to ensure a degree of
contestability, while common minimum prudential standards are enforced across the EU. We
include commercial, savings, cooperative and mortgage banks in our sample, but not investment
banks. This approach is in line with the work of Schaeck and Čihák (2012), who test commercial
banks versus a wider sample (not including mortgage banks, however) and conclude that
‘constraining the sample to profit maximizing institutions, although justified on theoretical grounds,
is not necessary for the empirical tests’ (2012, p. 838). We have 6,008 banks from 27 EU countries
over the period 1998–2012, thus including substantial periods both before and after the GFC. Usable
observations typically number around 10 to 30,000. The banks are well distributed across countries,
with Germany having the most banks, with just over 40% of the total, in contrast to studies such as
that of Berger et al. (2009), where US banks account for 91% of the sample. Regression data using
variables drawn from Bankscope are winsorized at the 1% level (as is common in the literature; e.g.,
Anginer et al., 2012). Details of the regression data and bank distributions by country are shown in
Tables A1 to A3 in Appendix B.
Supplementing the Bankscope data, we use macroeconomic data from the World Bank's
Financial Structure Database (Čihák et al., 2012a), which covers 1998–2011 in our sample. In
particular, this information provides us with data on stock market value traded/percent of the gross
domestic product to show the degree of securities market competition faced by banks. We also have
dummies available for the legal origin of the country, from the revised dataset of La Porta et al.
(2007).
Furthermore, we employ data from the World Bank's Bank Regulation and Supervision Surveys
that took place in 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011 and which are summarized in indices by Barth et al.
(2012).2 Potentially relevant data include, in particular, activity restrictions, limits on foreign banks,
the fraction of applications denied, initial capital stringency, the overall index for capital regulation,
supervisory power, a supervision index, multiple supervisors, a private monitoring index, a moral
hazard index, the percentage of foreign banks, and an external governance index. For a discussion,
see Barth et al. (2006). We construct a time series for these data following Beck et al. (2013), with
each observation holding for the preceding year and the two following years.
2The indices are downloadable from http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/ross_levine/Regulation.htm.
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4 | METHODOLOGY
We initially estimated revenue functions for the Panzar–Rosse H-statistic for each EU country.
According to this approach, market power is measured by the extent to which changes in factor prices
are reflected in revenues. With perfect competition and when banks operate within their long-run
equilibrium, a proportional increase in factor prices (including the interest rate on liabilities) induces an
equiproportional change in gross revenues. The output does not change in volume terms, while the
output price rises to the same extent as the input price (i.e., demand is perfectly elastic). On the other
hand, under monopolistic competition or where potential entry leads to a contestable market
equilibrium, revenues will increase less than proportionally, since the demand for banking products
facing individual banks is inelastic (Tirole, 1988). In the limiting case of a monopoly, there may be no
response or even a negative response of gross revenues to changes in input costs.
Following Bikker et al. (2012) and in line with Panzar and Rosse (1987), we use an unscaled
revenue function. Bikker et al. (2012) have shown that forms of scaling (e.g., including assets or equity
on the right-hand side) or the use of a price and not a revenue variable on the left (e.g., revenue scaled by
assets) upward-biases the H-statistic (i.e., imperfect competition is rejected too frequently). After
extensive testing using 100,000 observations on 17,000 banks in 63 countries over 1994–2004, the
authors find that price and scaled revenue functions cannot identify imperfect competition in the same
way unscaled revenue functions can and that ‘this conclusion disqualifies a number of studies since
they apply a Panzar–Rosse test based on a price function or scaled revenue function’ (Bikker et al.,
2012, p. 1016).
Accordingly, our estimating equation for the H-statistic is as follows:
LogRit ¼ ΣJðj¼1ÞαjLogwjit þ ΣN ðn¼1ÞγnLogXnit þ εit ð1Þ
for bank i at time t, where t= 1, . . .,T,withTbeing the number of periods observed; i= 1, . . ., I,with Ibeing
the total number of banks; and Rit is unscaled gross interest revenues. In our case, we have J= 3 inputs, so
that wit is a three-dimensional vector of factor prices (the logarithm of the ratio of interest expense to total
debt funding, IED; the logarithmof the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets,PTA; and the logarithmof
the ratio of other costs as a proportion of fixed assets,OCF), consistent with the intermediation approach to
banking output measurement, where bank liabilities are inputs to produce loans and other earning assets.
The term Xit is a vector of exogenous and bank-specific variables that may shift the cost and revenue
schedule (business mix). In this context, we have N= 4, the logarithm of loans as a proportion of assets,
LAR, showing credit risk (with an expected positive sign, since banks compensate for risk); the logarithmof
the ratio of other non-earning assets to total assets (OTA), reflecting asset composition; the logarithm of
customer deposits as a proportion of deposits plus money market liabilities (CDT), showing liquidity risk
(but whose sign is ambiguous); and the logarithm of equity to total assets (ETA), showing leverage and
hence risk preferences (expected to have a negative sign).
We first estimate the H-statistic by country and in subperiods, using the within estimator, with both
bank and year fixed effects in line with the results of De Bandt and Davis (2000), as well as pooled
feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) using White's (1980) method to reduce the impact of
heteroskedasticity.We also test for market equilibrium in sub-periods (results for these estimates are in
Davis and Karim (2013)). For the current exercise, we then estimate the H-statistic as an annual time
series for each individual country. We apply the restriction of at least 12 banks per year.
We then estimate the Lerner index for the EU as a whole, following Anginer et al. (2012). Beck
et al. (2013) and Weill (2013) and have tested it as a competition indicator. Accordingly, we first
estimate the following translog cost function:
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where Cit is total costs and TAit is the quantity of output and is measured as total assets. Our input prices
areW1,it, which is the ratio of interest expenses to the sum of total deposits and money market funding
(IES);W2,it ismeasured as personnel expenses divided by total assets (PTA); andW3,it is the ratio of other
operating expenses to fixed assets (OCF). Having estimated this equation, we impose the following
restrictions, again in line with the earlier authors, to ensure homogeneity of degree one in input prices:
β3 þ β4 þ β5 ¼ 1;   β6 þ β7 þ β8 ¼ 0;   β9 þ β12 þ β13 ¼ 0;   β10 þ β12 þ β14 ¼ 0;   β11 þ β13
þβ14 ¼ 0 ð3Þ
We then use the coefficient estimates from the previous regression to estimate the marginal costs
for bank i in calendar year t:
MCit ¼ δCit=δTAit ¼ Cit=TAit  ½β1 þ 2 β2  logðTAitÞ þ β6  logðW1,itÞ þ β7  logðW2,itÞ
þβ8  logðW3,itÞ ð4Þ
The Lerner index for each bank–year is:
Lernerit ¼ ðPit MCitÞ=Pit ð5Þ
where Pit is the price of assets and is equal to the ratio of total revenue to total assets.
To save space, we do not include the details of the estimates for the H-statistic and Lerner index as
outlined above, although the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables are
included in Appendix B.3 We then relate these annual competition variables to indicators of bank and
systemic risk, controlling for relevant variables. Our core results, in line with the bulk of the literature,
link competition each year to the logarithm of the Z-score for individual banks, which is defined as the
return on assets (ROA) plus the leverage ratio, divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets
over three years. As Liu et al. (2013) note, it is appropriate to use the logarithm of the Z-score, since the
level is highly skewed while the logarithm is normally distributed.We assess the H-statistic and Lerner
index as measures of competition in terms of both levels and differences, to distinguish between levels
of competition and change in competition. To our knowledge, this has not been done in the literature
and could capture important distinctions between long-run and dynamic aspects. The current difference
of the H-statistic and the Lerner index is complemented by the second and third lags of their levels, thus
avoiding any overlap between levels and differences and possible false conclusions. Since the H-
statistic is a countrywide variable, we did not consider it to be correlated with bank-level risk and,
accordingly, do not instrument the current difference, whereas we do so for the Lerner index.
3The regression results are available from the authors upon request.
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We run three sets of estimates: with bank-level variables only, with bank-level variables and
country dummies, and with additional macro-level control variables. In each case, we seek to shadow
the best practices of Beck et al. (2013):
Log Zit ¼ a0ΔHjt þ a1Hjt2 þ a2Hjt3 þ a3CDTit1 þ a4LARit1 þ a5NIRit1 þ a6logðTAÞit1
þa7PIIit1 þ a8ΔlogðTAÞit1 þ a9SMTjt þ a10CSIjt þ a11ACTjt þ a12LOjt þ εit ð6Þ
and
Log Zit ¼ a0ΔLernerðinstrumentedÞit þ a1Lernerit2 þ a2Lernerit3 þ a3CDTit1 þ a4LARit1
þa5NIRit1þa6logðTAÞit1 þ a7PIIit1 þ a8ΔlogðTAÞit1 þ a9SMTjt þ a10CSIjt þ a11ACTjt
þa12LOjt þ εit: ð7Þ
Accordingly, besides the H-statistic and the Lerner index, bank-level control variables in the risk
function (denoted with the subscript i) are customer deposits as a proportion of deposits plus money
market liabilities (CDT), the loan-to-asset ratio (LAR), the ratio of non-interest revenue to interest
revenue (NIR), bank size (log TA), the ratio of provisions to interest income (PII), and the growth rate of
assets (d log TA). All bank-specific variables (denoted with the subscript i) are lagged one year to avoid
simultaneity.
Regarding macro-level control variables at the country level (denoted with the subscript j), after
testing, we control for stock market turnover (SMT), which indicates the scope for securities market
financing, and, in terms of regulation, capital stringency (CSI) and activity restrictions (ACT), as well
as legal origin (LO). Since EU regulations are relatively homogeneous, we do not expect to find major
effects of regulation per se in our work.4 As for competition, we estimate using the within estimator
with year fixed effects as well as pooled FGLS using White's (1980) method to reduce the impact of
heteroskedasticity. Given our use of lags for bank-specific variables, we contend that this approach is
more appropriate and reliable than the generalized method of moments.
We note that the literature on competition and risk in banking makes virtually no reference to
panel unit roots. This omission likely relates to the fact that the time dimension is small and the
number of cross sections is very large, while most panel unit root testing focuses on time series and
cross section values of reasonable size, as in a cross-country macro dataset. Note that we did run
tests on the stationarity of the key variables (logarithm of the Z-score at the bank level, the H-
statistic at the country level, and the Lerner index at the bank level) and we find that they were
stationary on the principal tests (Levin–Lin–Chu, Im–Pesaran–Shin, Fisher augmented Dickey–
Fuller, and Fisher Phillips–Perron). This result justifies our specification with, for example, the
level of the dependent variable.
As a robustness check, we run the various regressions with an alternative measure of risk, which is
impaired loans as a proportion of total loans. In bank-dominated systems, as in much of the EU, this is a
fairly accurate measure of risk for all but the largest banks (which hold proportionately more
securities). There were, however, much fewer observations, especially before 2007, making the earlier
estimates relatively unreliable.We also run further robustness checks with bank fixed effects, clustered
standard errors and bootstrapped standard errors.
4Indeed, in a study of EU risk and competition down to the regional level, Liu et al. (2013) omit all regulatory controls.
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5 | ESTIMATION
Having estimated the H-statistic year by year, as outlined above, to obtain a time series for the H-
statistic for each country, we then winsorize the H-statistic at 95%, given the number of outliers
resulting from the year-by-year estimation procedure and the lack of scaling for the revenue function.
This approach gives a range from roughly +1 (behavior in line with perfect competition) to −2
(monopolistic behavior).5 To compare and contrast with our results for the H-statistic, we go on to
estimate the Lerner index, showing price–marginal cost margins for banks in the EU as described
above, deriving themarginal cost for banks in each year of the sample.6 The Lerner index then provides
an alternative measure of competition in the banking system, with narrower margins tending to
accompany an increase in competition.
Beginningwith the results for the H-statistic, as noted, we estimated the current difference of theH-
statistic and levels at lags 2 and 3. This approach also avoids spurious results from overlapping
differences and levels. It has a natural interpretation in terms of the short-run relationship to changes in
competition being estimated separately from the long-run relationship to levels of competition, in line
with the discussion in sections 1 and 2. As noted, since the H-statistic is a macro variable, we do not
consider it likely to be highly correlated with individual bank Z-scores, so we do not instrument its
current difference. We start with work on the pre-crisis period where a link from competition to risk
would have offered an early warning. Accordingly, the basic Z-score results for all the countries and the
pre-crisis period 1998–2006 are shown in Table 2.
Recall that a higher Z-score indicates a less risky bank (i.e., with higher profitability and/or capital
and less volatile profits). The core result shows that the difference of the H-statistic is negative and
significant, whereas the lagged levels of the H-statistic are positive and significant. The short-run effect
is shown by the coefficient of the difference, which is −0.036 in this case, while the long-run effect is
the sum of the significant coefficients for the levels, which, in this case, is 0.263. Accordingly, a change
in the level of competition is harmful to banks’ solvency, consistent with slow adaptation to change and
disaster myopia during periods of apparent high profitability. On the other hand, this result suggests
that the level of competition per se is not a cause of risk. Banks can adapt to competitive conditions and
remain solvent, for example, by holding more capital, as consistently found by Schaeck and Čihák
(2012).
Regarding the other bank-specific variables, a higher share of deposits in total short-term funding
reduces risk, a result that was strongly borne out later during theGFC,whenwholesale funding dried up
(a similar result was noted by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). A greater loan share in total assets
also reduces risk, perhaps reflecting volatile securities holdings or greater risks run by large banks,
which have lower loan-to-asset ratios. A higher ratio of non-interest income is negative for solvency
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010), since the earlier promises that non-interest income could
stabilize profits were not borne out over the data period. Again, it is large banks that tend to have greater
non-interest income. The logarithm of total assets is not significant, but a rise in total assets strongly
raises risk (perhaps reflecting adverse selection when assets rise sharply). Finally, the ratio of
provisions to interest income is directly and strongly negatively related to risk. The results for the
5Testing for market equilibrium in sub-periods 1998–2006 and 2007–12, as well as 1998–2012 (Davis and Karim, 2013),
we find most countries are shown to be in equilibrium in both the full period and the sub-periods. The key exceptions are
Germany and Sweden, which fail the test in all sub-periods. Latvia and Lithuania also fail in the sub-periods, while, during
the crisis, disequilibrium is shown for Estonia, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands and Slovenia.
6The estimates are available from the authors upon request.
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provisions ratio, change in assets, and non-interest share are also consistent with those of Beck et al.
(2013, Table 5). However, for a global sample, Beck et al. find a positive link of size to stability that is
not present in our EU sample. Note also that the authors use the Lerner index and not the H-statistic as a
competition/market power indicator (we experiment with the Lerner index below).
Table 3 presents the results for a regression with country dummies as well, hence, capturing effects
on the average Z-score that are country specific and not explained by other variables.
We leave out the dummy for one country (Germany), since it is necessary for identification; the
dummies are not included in Table 3. Our results are consistent with those in Table 2 and the H-statistic
results are again significant at the 95% level for the dynamic term and the second lag level term,
although the third lag is insignificant. The coefficient for the growth of total assets also becomes
insignificant in this case.
Our thirdmain set of results, shown in Table 4, is for a regression includingmacro variables relating
to financial structure and regulation. Following a search, we include the stock market turnover ratio,
dummies for legal origin, and regulation variables for activity restrictions and stringency of capital
regulations.
The results here are consistent with those in Tables 2 and 3, with the difference for the H-statistic
significant at the 1% level, while the level effect is now significant at the second lag at the 10% level.
Again, the total assets variable is insignificant. Regarding legal origin, we omit the French legal origin,
since it covers the majority of EU countries. A British or German legal origin is shown to be associated
TABLE 2 Log Z-score results for the EU, 1998–2006 (dependent variable = log Z-score)
This table presents the regression results for EU banks from 1998 to 2006 with the logarithm of the Z-score as the
dependent variable, estimated using the within estimator and pooled FGLS, with year fixed effects and White's cross-
sectional standard errors and covariance (corrected for degrees of freedom). The variables are defined as follows:H is the
Panzar–Rosse H-statistic for the country and year in question; CDT deposits as a share of short-term funding; LAR is the
loan-to-assets ratio; NIR is the ratio of non-interest revenue to interest revenue; TA is bank size (total assets); and PII is
provisions to interest income. The term Δ indicates the first difference. All variables are winsorized at 99%, except H
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with higher Z-scores, on average, while a Scandinavian legal origin has a similar effect as a French one
(during the pre-crisis period). Authorities imposing tighter activity restrictions are associated with
lower Z-scores and hence less stable banks.
It is of interest to see whether the result shown in Tables 2–4 above of a positive H-statistic in the
level and negative in the difference is stable in different samples. We show a variety of estimates,
including for the later sub-period and the full sample, in Table 5.
Whereas the three specifications have consistent significance for the level and difference across the
earlier period, 1998–2006 (reproducing the results in Tables 2–4), this is not the case for the full period
(1998–2012) or the later sub-period (2007–12), where the level effect dominates, although the sign of
the insignificant difference term remains negative. We contend that, in the short run, there remains a
need for caution regarding risk when competition increases. This is in line with the competition–
fragility approach, which finds wide support elsewhere in the literature. Meanwhile, the consistent
finding of a positive long-run relationship of competition with soundness offers support for the
competition–stability approach in the long run, in line with Anginer et al. (2012), among others. In
terms of magnitude, the results imply that a one-year shift from a position of low competition (H= 0.0)
to a higher level (H= 0.5)7 would induce a drop in the Z-score of around 2–4% in the short run, while
the Z-score would rise in the long run by 5–15%. We consider these magnitudes plausible.
TABLE 3 Log Z-score results for the EU with country dummies, 1998–2006
This table presents the regression results for EU banks from 1998 to 2006 with the logarithm of the Z-score as the
dependent variable, estimated as shown in the header of Table 2. Country dummies (excluding Germany) are also
included in the regression. The variables are defined as in Table 2. The termΔ indicates the first difference. All variables
are winsorized at 99%, except H (95%). The t-values are in parentheses. The superscripts ***, ** and * indicate















7These values are typical of countries with low and high levels of banking competition over the data period, as shown in
Davis and Karim (2013).
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A natural comparison with the results above is to then include the Lerner index instead of the H-
statistic in the equation for the logarithm of the Z-score. In the work of Beck et al. (2013), for example,
the current level of the Lerner index is consistently positive, since a high margin indicates a safer bank
and hence a higher Z-score and vice versa. However, we contend that such a result is contestable: As
Beck et al. point out, there is an element of circularity in the argument, since the Lerner index itself
includes the return on assets, which, in turn, is strongly related to the price–cost margin, as indicated by
the Lerner index (correlation of 0.5). Accordingly, the Lerner index should at least be instrumented to
avoid bias from this simultaneity if the current level is used and otherwise lagged. Therefore and in line
with our work for the H-statistic, we include the current difference and the second and third lags for the
Lerner index, winsorized at the 99% level. To avoid simultaneity, we instrument the current difference
of the Lerner index with the first and second lagged differences. The results are shown in Table 6.
The first difference term is consistent with the result for the differencedH-statistic, in the sense that,
given a positive sign, a rise in competition (reduction in the Lerner index) links to a decline in the
margin and less stable banks. This result applies consistently across the full and later period samples, in
TABLE 4 Log Z-score results for the EU with macro variables, 1998–2006
This table presents the regression results for EU banks from 1998 to 2006 with the logarithm of the Z-score as the
dependent variable, estimated as shown in Table 2., The variable SMT indicates stock market turnover, LOBRIT British
legal origin, LOSCAND Scandinavian legal origin, LOGER German legal origin, ACT activity restrictions, and CSI
capital stringency. The remainder of the variables are defined as in Table 2. The termΔ indicates the first difference. All
variables are winsorized at 99%, exceptH (95%). The t-values are in parentheses. The superscripts ***, ** and * indicate


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































16 | DAVIS AND KARIM
contrast to the dynamic result for the H-statistic, which is largely confined to the 1998–2006 sample,
although it is not significant for the basic specification in 2007–12. Meanwhile, concerning levels, it is
the second lag that is significant, except for 2007–12, again with a positive sign, implying a long-run
negative impact of competition on risk. Accordingly, the Lerner index favors the competition–fragility
hypothesis in both the short and long run, the latter being in line with the work of authors such as Fu
et al. (2014). In terms of magnitude, the results imply that a drop in margins of 0.1 (half of the mean
level of 0.2) links to a reduction in the Z-score of around 3–5%, whereas, in the long run, the reduction
is 7–9%. We consider these values economically plausible.
Hence, we have similar results between the two competition indicators for the impact of changes in
competition on bank risk, namely, that a rise in competition leads to deterioration in bank soundness, as
measured by the Z-score (competition–fragility). On the other hand, the H-statistic consistently shows
a long-run negative relationship between competition and risk (i.e., banks, in the long run, are safer in
competitive markets, or competition–stability), while the Lerner statistic indicates a negative long-run
relationship for the same banks (i.e., banks, in the long run, are less safe in markets with narrower
price–cost margins, or competition–fragility).
As a first robustness check of this result, we run the basic regressions for both the H-statistic and the
Lerner index (i.e., with extra variables, as in Table 2) for a different dependent variable, namely, the
ratio of impaired loans to total loans. This measure has a much smaller coverage than the Z-score, with
less than 10,000 observations and rather few before 2007. The results for the H-statistic and the Lerner
index are as shown in Table 7.
There is a broad tendency for the relationship of each variable to impaired loan ratios to be negative
in the long run. The dynamics are less significant than with the Z-score, perhaps partly reflecting the
lack of observations in the earlier sample. Accordingly, the data indicate that a higher level of
competition in the long run (a higher H-statistic) leads to fewer impaired loans and hence less risk
(competition–stability). On the other hand, the Lerner index results for both the short and long run
imply that the narrower the margin (i.e., the greater the competition), the higher the impaired loan rate
(competition–fragility). This pattern reverts to zero after three years in the later samples, however,
probably reflecting cyclical patterns and the effect of the GFC.
We consider the macro equation most appropriate for further robustness checks, since it allows for
regulatory and structural factors and, accordingly, controls for omitted variable bias. The checks are
threefold. First, we provide estimates with bank-level fixed effects (bearing in mind the above results
have time dummies and in some cases country dummies). It can be argued that this will help distinguish
short-run impacts of competition from long-run impacts. Including bank fixed effects is also important
because of the sample's high heterogeneity, as in different types of banks. Second, we provide estimates
using country-clustered standard errors. The reason is that, since the H-statistic is a country-level
variable, the error term should be clustered at the country level to allow for potential correlations in
bank risk. Third, since the H-statistic and the Lerner index are calculated with estimated coefficients
from first-stage regressions, one needs to pay attention to the extra variance introduced by the first-
stage estimation. One way to correct the standard error in the second-stage regressions is to use
bootstrapping, which we have also done.
Summarizing results shown in Tables 8 and 9, consistent with the baseline results above, we find
a significant short-run link of the H-statistic to increased risk for all sub-periods with the bank
dummies and for 1998–2006 and 1998–2012 for clustered standard errors and bootstrapping,
respectively. In the long run, the H-statistic is significantly linked to reduced risk for the bank
dummies for the second lag in the earlier period. For clustered standard errors and bootstrapping, the
H-statistic is significant in the long run for all samples for the second lag and for all but the earlier
period for the third lag. Regarding the Lerner index, the short-run effect linked to increased risk is
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present in all sub-periods except 1998–2006 as for the basic results, while for the long run, there is
again a positive effect for the second lag except for the bank dummies in 1998–2012 where it is
insignificant, and in 2007–2012 where it has a significant negative relationship. Generally, the
robustness checks strongly support the main results.
6 | ASSESSING THE DIFFERENCES IN RESULTS
Given the consistent differences in long-run relationships of the H-statistic and the Lerner index to risk,
we conclude by investigating the reasons for such differing long-term results. There are conceptual
differences between the H-statistic and the Lerner index, as shown by Carbo et al. (2009), in that the
former is a difference term (elasticity of revenue to prices) and the latter is a level effect (price to
marginal cost margin). Furthermore, the H-statistic is a macroeconomic index describing the situation
in the banking sector as a whole, while the Lerner index describes the price cost margin of an individual
bank.
We seek to find the reasons for the differing predictions by regressing the level of each indicator of
competition on the sub-components of the Z-score. These sub-components are the return on assets
(ROA), which as noted is a measure of performance; capital adequacy, a measure of safety and
soundness and the volatility of the return on assets, a measure of risk. We estimated these relationships
TABLE 7 Robustness check − Results for competition indicators using the impaired loan ratio as the risk variable
This table presents the regression results for EU banks from 1998 to 2006, from 1998 to 2012, and from 2007 to 2012,
with the impaired loan ratio as the dependent variable, estimated as indicated in Table 2. The variable H is the Panzar–
Rosse H-statistic for the country and year in question, ΔLerner_inst is the current difference of the Lerner index
instrumented by two lags of itself, while Lerner is the Lerner index itself. Additional variables are as in Table 2 and Δ
indicates the first difference. All variables are winsorized at 99% except H (95%). The t-values are in parentheses. The
superscripts ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
H-Statistic
Variable 1998–2006 1998–2012 2007–2012
ΔH(t) −0.00293 (0.4) −0.00232 (0.4) −0.0098 (0.1)
H(t–2) −0.00367 (1.3) −0.00839*** (3.5) −0.00959*** (3.0)
H(t–3) −0.0024 (0.3) −0.00831** (2.2) −0.00845** (1.9)
Adj-R2 0.039 0.32 0.34
Observations 797 7,408 6,611
Banks 365 2,033 1,908
Lerner index
Variable 1998–2006 1998–2012 2007–2012
ΔLerner_inst(t) −0.0227 (0.8) −0.022* (1.9) −0.023** (2.0)
Lerner(t–2) −0.1377*** (6.1) −0.063*** (2.6) −0.05** (1.9)
Lerner(t–3) −0.00437 (0.3) 0.067** (2.2) 0.083** (2.5)
Adj-R2 0.12 0.33 0.36
Observations 636 5,784 5,148
Banks 229 1,800 1,683







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20 | DAVIS AND KARIM
using a specification similar to that in Table 2 (i.e., including the basic control variables) and a lagged
level of the relevant competition indicator estimated over the whole sample (we find the same results
hold over each sub-sample as well). The results are shown in Table 10.
We multiply the Lerner index by −1 so that, in both cases, an increase in the indicator is
consistent with higher competition. The results show that both the H-statistic and the Lerner index*
−1 are negatively related to both ROA and capital adequacy. In other words, increased competition
on both measures is related to lower profits and lower capital cover, thus reducing the Z-score. On
the other hand, we find a difference in the relationship to the standard deviation of profitability, with
the H-statistic having a negative relationship (higher levels of market competition are related to a
lower volatility of profits), and Lerner * −1 having a positive relationship (narrower price–cost
margins for an individual bank accompany an increase in the volatility of profits). The outcome of
these different effects for the Z-score, the overall measure of risk, is that greater market competition
(as indicated by the H-statistic) links to less risky positions in the long run, while narrower price–
cost margins (indicated by the Lerner index) lead to increased risk. The same results, including the
contrast for profit volatility, apply in all cases and with similar significance for the two sub-periods
(1998–2006 and 2007–12). In other words, it is not an artefact of either the boom period or the later
financial crisis.
A full investigation of reasons for these differences is beyond the scope of this paper. However,
note, first, that the H-statistic is a countrywide indicator, while the Lerner index is a bank-specific one.
While there is a general tendency for greater competition to lead to narrower margins, this need not
always be the case (e.g., existing monopolists seeking a ‘quiet life’ and obtaining their rents by
allowing their banks to remain inefficient; see Koetter et al., 2012). Numerically, narrower margins are
likely to lead to greater profit volatility, since they are closer to zero, while the link between profit
volatility and market competition is less direct, given the latter is measured by the response of revenue
to input prices.
Taking the results at face value, this section suggests overall a need for caution in drawing policy
conclusions from risk–competition studies without carefully considering the likely impact of a given
policy shift. For example, the separation of retail and wholesale banking or certain macroprudential
policies could have different effects on margins (as shown by the Lerner index) as opposed to market
competition (as shown by the H-statistic).Margin effects consistently increase risk, whereas our results
suggest that more competition is favorable for soundness in the long run.
TABLE 10 Relationship between the H-statistic, the Lerner index, and the components of the Z-score (1998–2012)
This table reports the sign of the coefficient of the lagged H-statistic (H) and the lagged Lerner index (Lerner) in
regressions on the dependent variables for bank return on assets (ROA), bank capital adequacy, the standard deviation of
the return on assets over the previous three years (St. Dev. (ROA)), and the Z-score. The estimation method and other
independent variables are as in Table 2. All effects are significant at the 1% level.
Dependent variable Lag H Lag Lerner (* −1)
ROA − −
Capital adequacy − −
St. Dev. (ROA) − +
Z-Score + −
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7 | CONCLUSIONS
This is, to our knowledge, the first empirical study of banking competition and risk to allow changes in
competitive conditions, as well as levels, to impact on risk. It is also one of the first studies to assess
comparable periods before and after the GFC and to compare and contrast the results using two
competition indicators: the H-statistic (which indicates the scope of competition in the country
concerned) and the Lerner index (which indicates profit margins bank by bank). In doing so, we
highlight further nuances in the relationship between competition and stability in banking that have not
been emphasized in the literature to date. We employ an extensive dataset of banks from 27 EU
countries over the period from 1998 to 2012, with typically around 10 to 30,000 usable observations,
and we use control variables similar to those of Beck et al. (2013).
The results can be summarized as follows:
1. In the short run, we find that a change in competition has a consistently positive relationship to risk,
regardless of whether we use the H-statistic or the Lerner index as a measure of competition.
2. In the long run, the results differ between the two competition measures, with the H-statistic
showing a negative relationship of competition to risk, while the Lerner index correlates positively
with risk.
3. Estimates made over periods before and after the GFC as well as over the full sample yield broadly
consistent results.
4. Robustness checks with impaired loans as a dependent variable and with bank dummies, clustered
standard errors, and bootstrap estimations underpin the main results of the analysis.
5. The differing long-run relationships between the risk measure, the logarithm of the Z-score, and the
competition measures link to the fact that a rise in competition as indicated by the H-statistic is
negatively related to the volatility of bank profits, while the Lerner index has a positive such link.
We conclude that the most important contribution of this study is the consistent short-run link from
competition to risk, which has not been tested in the literature to date.
These results have important implications for policymaking, showing that considerable caution is
warranted by regulators in the initial period after a rise in competition, since the indicators consistently
show an accompanying rise in bank risk. In the longer term, our results suggest the need for careful
consideration of the likely impact of a given policy shift, such as the separation of retail and wholesale
banking or certain macroprudential policies. A direct impact on margins (as indicated by the Lerner
index) is shown to be deleterious to risk, while enhancing competition (as indicated by the H-statistic)
generally tends to enhance soundness.
An interesting topic for future research is the identification of factors underlying changes to
competition. Such research could be feasible, for example, with US data, focusing on bank
deregulation in the 1980s, or in emerging market economies where pro-competition reforms have been
introduced. Studies in which such a shock affects competition but is exogenous to bank risk could shed
light on the causal relationship between bank risk and competition. There could also be further testing
of factors that could influence the trade-off between competition and risk in the short and long run,
including potential variation by bank type, for Eastern European countries as opposed to Western
countries, and depending on bank leverage and on excess capacity in banking.
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APPENDIX A
An Industrial Approach to Financial Instability
Davis (1995, 1999) suggests that an industrial analysis based on the effects of changes in entry
conditions in financial markets can provide a supplementary set of underlying factors and transmission
mechanisms to existing theories of financial instability. The easing of entry barriers can be due to
deregulation, technical progressormarket developments reducing the comparative advantageof incumbents
over newentrants.Note that such a framework does not require an actual newentry; rather, the key is that the
sunk (irrecoverable) costs ofmarket entry should decline (Tirole, 1988). This could be reflected in themore
competitive behavior of incumbents to protect themselves from the threat of entry. It is commonly observed
that such changes in entry barriers do notmerely entail reductions in profit and/or the smooth elimination of
excess capacity.Rather, reductions in spreads and increases in quantities of credit go beyond the equilibrium
level (i.e., the level at which lenders canmake normal profits on their lending business, on average, over the
cycle), leaving the institutions involved vulnerable to financial instability.Note that this pattern is, by nature,
a short-run phenomenon and, in due course, normal behavior will reassert itself.
Drawing on theories of financial instability and applying the logic of market competition, we argue
that the following mechanisms, among others, could play a role:
- To the extent that new entrants to financial markets can induce borrowers to switch away from
established credit relationships or offer extra credit (by offering lower prices), information-based
linkages will be weakened and existing information devalued. Conceptually, new lenders may be seen
as ‘cannibalizing’ existing market information and structure, to the detriment of existing firms.
Nonetheless, new lenders are still likely to lend on the basis of inadequate or asymmetric information.
- Uncertainty may be increased by new entry. Incumbents may be unable to predict accurately the
responses of new entrants to changing conditions and their existing knowledge ofmarket dynamicswill
be rendered less useful. Entrants, inexperienced in the market, will face even greater uncertainty.
Unaware of the dynamics of supply and demand in themarket, theymay be prone to herd-like behavior,
for example, all lending to the same type of client.When the market itself is new (or after liberalization,
when interest rate controls that previously prevented lending to risky borrowers have been removed),
all institutions will face uncertainty.
- Competition may cause firms to make inadequate provisions for uncertain events, such as
financial crises, because firms that make adequate provisions are undercut by those disregarding such
possibilities for reasons of ignorance or competitive advantage. New entrants may be particularly
prone to such undercutting.
Sufficiently short time horizons may even make firms disregard systematic risks such as the
economic cycle in their risk appraisals and, so, again, via the process of competition, help to reduce
prudential standards for the whole market. Hit-and-run entry, as predicted by the theory of contestable
markets, must, by nature, have a short time horizon during the initial stages. Thus, for both types of
lenders, entry may lead to a lowering of credit standards.
- Competition for market share, as stressed by managerial theories of the firm − an approach
frequently adopted by entrants or in new and developing markets −may lead to cumulative reductions
in market prices until checked by the losses of participants and withdrawal or retrenchment. Such
competition may persist if participants can cross-subsidize their operations from others making excess
profits (i.e., there is market failure elsewhere) and are relatively immune to takeovers, as is the case for
banks in most countries. The evaluation of loan officers over a short period on the basis of current
lending performance is typical of market share-oriented banks.
- Besides the features outlined above, which are of particular importance in financial markets,
several more general features of competitive processes may cause the competitive equilibrium to be
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overshot. Firms earning normal profits on their existing products may all be simultaneously attracted to
situations offering potential for growth, but individual firms are unable to predict whether rivals will
follow. Such tendencies will be particularly marked if there is no clear ordering of firms in terms of
likelihood of success. Once investments are sunk, entry decisions may be difficult to reverse.
Moreover, if there are sunk costs, firms may find it optimal to stay in the market for some time, even if
they incur losses, as they will lose sunk costs of reputation, and so forth, if they leave. During this
period, they may be vulnerable to adverse conditions in financial markets.
APPENDIX B
Variable Statistics
TABLE A1 Number of banks, by country
This table reports the countries included in the sample, the number of banks for each country, and the percentage of the














Austria 361 6.01 Germany 2,571 42.79 Netherlands 74 1.23
Belgium 106 1.76 Greece 31 0.52 Poland 76 1.26
Bulgaria 31 0.52 Hungary 49 0.82 Portugal 49 0.82
Cyprus 27 0.45 Ireland 41 0.68 Romania 38 0.63
Czech
Republic
39 0.65 Italy 902 15.01 Slovakia 28 0.47
Denmark 147 2.45 Latvia 32 0.53 Slovenia 33 0.55
Estonia 14 0.23 Lithuania 16 0.27 Spain 257 4.28
Finland 25 0.42 Luxembourg 148 2.46 Sweden 125 2.08
France 483 8.04 Malta 13 0.22 UK 292 4.86
TABLE A2 Variables for the H-statistic and the Lerner index
This table reports the statistical properties of the independent variables used in the regressions to determine competition,
showing the variable definitions and their abbreviation, the number of observations, and the mean, standard deviation,
minimum and maximum for each variable. Variables marked * are winsorized at 99%.
Variable definition/code Observations Mean
Standard
deviation Maximum Minimum
R (Total interest revenue)* 46,148 270,522 1,041,025 8,541,040 744.9
IED (interest expense/debt)* 46,142 0.027 0.014 0.1 0.003
PTA (personnel expenses/assets)* 45,189 0.014 0.007 0.053 0.0004
OCF (other costs/fixed assets)* 45,224 2.2 5.18 38.0 0.18
CDT (deposits/short-term funding)* 43,563 0.78 0.21 1.0 0.02
(Continues)
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TABLE A2 (Continued)
Variable definition/code Observations Mean
Standard
deviation Maximum Minimum
LAR (loan/asset ratio)* 43,861 0.59 0.18 0.94 0.04
OTA (other non-earning assets/total
assets)*
43,948 0.016 0.023 0.158 0.001
ETA (equity/total assets)* 43,971 0.079 0.052 0.356 0.016
IES (interest expense/total deposits plus
money market funding)*
42,190 0.028 0.014 0.1 0.006
TOTALC (total cost)* 44,971 268,570 1,034,403 8,508,045 1,178
TABLE A3 Variables for risk/competition
This table reports the statistical properties of the variables used in the regressions to determine risk, showing the variable
definitions and their code, the number of observations, and the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum for
each variable. Variables marked * are winsorized at 99%, except for the H-statistic (95%).
Variable definition/code Observations Mean
Standard
deviation Maximum Minimum
Log Z (Log Z-score)* 32,118 3.76 1.06 6.56 0.69
H (H-Statistic)* 86,774 −0.07 0.82 1.04 −1.9
Lerner (Lerner index)* 40,706 0.2 0.106 0.49 −0.15
CDT (deposits/short-term funding)* 43,563 0.78 0.21 1.0 0.02
LAR (loan/asset ratio)* 43,861 0.59 0.18 0.94 0.04
NIR (non-interest revenue/interest
revenue)*
46,026 0.26 0.44 3.64 −0.06
LogTA (log total assets)* 46,842 13.6 1.8 19.3 9.8
PII (provisions/interest income)* 44,128 0.09 0.12 0.69 −0.26
SMT (stock market turnover) 83,664 106.9 50.7 259.6 0.14
CSI (capital stringency) 89,392 1.7 0.69 3 0
ACT (activity restrictions) 81,915 5.5 1.74 11 3
LOGER (German legal origin) 90,120 0.54 0.5 1 0
LOFR (French legal origin) 90,120 0.35 0.48 1 0
LOBRIT (UK legal origin) 90,120 0.06 0.23 1 0
LOSCAND (Scandinavian legal
origin)
90,120 0.05 0.22 1 0
IMP (impaired loan ratio)* 10,202 0.067 0.072 0.43 0.0003
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